# TenureWeightedFees

> Pays liquidity that stays more than liquidity that visits, by skimming a slice of every swap into a pot and sharing it out in proportion to how long each position has been in the pool.

A production Uniswap v4 hook. Source: https://github.com/nirholas/tenure-weighted-fees. Part of the HookForge catalogue: https://hookforge.pages.dev

## How it works
A Uniswap pool pays for capital present at the moment of a swap and is indifferent to everything else. That is a defensible rule and it has a consequence: the most profitable way to provide liquidity is to not provide it. Wait until a large trade is visible, add liquidity in front of it, collect the fee, and remove. The position existed for two transactions, earned the same rate as capital that had been quoting for a month, and took none of the risk that month carried. Just-in-time provision is the sharpest version, and hooks exist that penalise it directly. But the penalty is treating a symptom: the pool's fee schedule genuinely does not distinguish a month of quoting from a moment of it, and every provider who does the useful thing is underpaid relative to one who does not. This hook adds a second, parallel payment that does distinguish. It skims `skimBps` of every swap into a pot, and shares the pot by tenure-weighted stake: a position's share is its liquidity multiplied by a tenure multiplier that steps up as it stays. The ordinary Uniswap fee is untouched and still goes to whoever is in range, so nobody is taxed for arriving; the tenure pot is simply money a passer-through never accrues any claim on. The multiplier steps at configured thresholds rather than growing continuously, and that is deliberate. A share that grows continuously cannot be tracked by a reward accumulator without either re-deriving every position on every swap or accepting drift. Discrete tiers change a position's share at known instants, which an accumulator handles exactly, so nobody is short-changed by an approximation. A position's tier is applied when it is next touched, and {poke} lets anybody touch any position, so realising an upgrade never depends on the pool being busy. Rewards accrue in whichever currency each swap paid them in, so the pot holds both. Claims settle both sides.

## Prior art
Liquidity-mining schemes weight by liquidity and time, off-pool and funded by an emissions budget. LiquidityPenalty and the JIT-defence hooks punish short-lived positions. Curve's vote-escrow weights governance by lock length. Paying tenure out of the pool's own trading flow, alongside an untouched Uniswap fee, so that staying is rewarded without arriving being taxed, is the contribution here.

## Where it does not help
Tenure is measured per position key, so a provider who removes and re-adds starts again, and one who tops up an existing position keeps their tier on the larger amount. That is the intended behaviour but it means the tier is a property of the position rather than of the provider, and a provider holding several positions accrues several independent tenures. The pot is also funded by a skim, so it is not free: swappers pay it, and a pool that sets `skimBps` too high will simply be routed around.

## Facts
Slug: tenure-weighted-fees
Contract: TenureWeightedFeesHook
Callbacks: afterSwapReturnsDelta, afterSwap, afterRemoveLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, afterInitialize
Parameters: none
Dynamic fee required: no

## Caveats
- Unaudited.
- A deployment with status "deterministic" is a mined CREATE2 address with no code at it yet. Never present one as live.